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NOTES AND COMMENTS
THE PRESS IN A BLACK ROBE
INTRODUCTION
It is press' coverage of the accused criminal prior to, during, and after
trial which is the subject of inquiry in this article. Too often it appears the
press wears the black robe; that the press, not the judge, rules upon the
admission of evidence and instructs the jury. The courtroom can become a
press box with newsmen free to prod witnesses, harass the defendant, and
intimidate the judge. Prosecution and defense, even the court itself, play to
the press for a variety of reasons that are too frequently selfish or dishonest.2
The result is serious interference with the administration of criminal justice.
THE PROBLEM
Why is news reporting a source of concern? It is not merely a matter of
decorum in the courtroom, although this is important if the courts are to
enjoy the community's respect.
The main issue is the criminal defendant's right to a fair trial. The
problem has been stated with clarity and precision by Carolyn Jaffe:
In the exercise of his constitutional right to a fair trial, every
criminal defendant may demand trial by an impartial jury. Often,
however, publicity exposes potential or actual jury members to in-
formation which is not eventually admitted in evidence at the trial.
By thus enabling the jury to consider incompetent material, public-
ity can be prejudicial to the defendant, with the result he is unable
to exercise his right to a fair trial.3
The accused criminal is to be convicted or acquitted exclusively on the
basis of evidence which is acceptable to the court. The rules of evidence are
designed to insure what the jury hears and sees is as reliable as men can make
it. The defendant will not have the fair trial to which he is entitled unless
the jury's verdict is based upon what they have witnessed in the courtroom,
not upon uncensored comments from outside the court's walls.
I "Press" includes all of the news media.
2 In Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 US. 333 (1966), the judge was running for reelection.
His handling of the trial demonstrated he subordinated a fair trial to his own need for
appearing in a favorable light before the voters. In People v. Cain, 36 Ill. 2d 589, 224
N.E.2d 786 (1967), the defense capitalized upon the prejudicial publicity issue. There is an
inescapable inference from the opinion that the defense may have instigated the incidents
which gave rise to the publicity in order to secure a basis for mistrial.
3 Jaffe, Press and the Oppressed: Part 1, 56 J. Crim. L.C. & P.S. 1 (1965).
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DILEMMA OR MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING
With almost characteristic myopia4 the press sees no problem. Judge
Hubert Will, United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, writes in the DePaul Law Review, ".... The press demands proof,
contending there is no scientific evidence that prejudice does result from the
publication of information which the law will not permit the jury to consider
in determining guilt or innocence." 5 Carolyn Jaffe reports the skepticism of
the press in her study of free press vs. free trial: ".... .Newsmen almost
uniformly demanded empirical evidence that publication of what defense
attorneys call prejudicial publicity in fact causes juries to be prejudiced
against defendants." 6 The American Bar Association's Committee on Stan-
dards Relating to Fair Trial and Free Press notes ".... that efforts (by the
press) 7 to brush aside the problem as involving only 'a pitiful string of
decisions' must be rejected."8
Because the press is unconvinced that news reports affect the defendant's
right to a fair trial, any attempt to restrict information about the accused
criminal or his trial meets adamant resistance. 0. W. Wilson, superintendant
of Chicago police from 1960 to 1968, relates his exposure to representatives
of the news media who were outraged by his proposal to withhold certain
news items about criminal suspects:
We distributed the proposed order to members of the press and
at the same time invited them to a meeting in my office at which
they might comment upon the order. The response was overwhelm-
ing-and very negative, I might add. Everyone from publishers to
cub reporters showed up and all vociferously objected.9
At a recent meeting of Sigma Delta Chi, the national journalism society,
members of the news media ".... attacked the Reardon Report of the Amer-
ican Bar Association and said it caused serious problems for the press."' 0
They criticized ".... high restrictive press regulations surrounding the trials
of Sirhan Sirhan and James Earl Ray."'"
If the press cannot see itself as an obstruction to the defendant's right
4 The author raised this issue with several newsmen and was promptly rebuffed:
"Just an attempt to suppress the press." "No substance to the charge at all." "Why don't
the courts do their job and stop blaming the press for their own incompetence."
5 Will, Free Press v. Fair Trial, 12 DePaul L. Rev. 197, 206 (1963).
6 Jaffe, Press and the Oppressed: Part II, 56 J. Crim. L.C. & P.S. 158, 160 (1965).
7 Parentheses are the author's.
8 Reardon, Standards Relating to Fair Trial and Free Press, A.B.A. Project on Minimal
Standards for Criminal Justice at 322-3 (1968).
9 Wilson, Fair Trial-Whose Responsibility?, 2 American News. Publ. Ass'n Cony. Bull.
9, 14 (1967). The order was patterned after the direction of Attorney General Katzenbach
to personnel of the Justice Department. Mr. Katzenbach's directive followed the Sheppard
v. Maxwell, 384 US. 333 (1966), decision, and was designed to conform to the law as it was
set forth in that case. Because of the objections from the press, 0. W. Wilson withdrew
his order. The text of the cancelled order is set out on page 13 of the above article.
10 Chicago Sun-Times, November 20, 1968, at page 27.
11 Ibid.
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to a fair trial, the United States Supreme Court can. Justice Frankfurter
wrote in a concurring opinion in Irwin v. Dodd:12
Not a term passes without this court being importuned to re-
view convictions, heard in State Courts throughout the country, in
which substantial claims are made that a jury trial has been dis-
torted because of inflammatory newspaper accounts-too often, as
in this case, with the prosecutor's collaboration--exerting pressures
upon potential jurors before trial and even during the course of
trial, thereby making it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to se-
cure a jury capable of taking in, free of prepossessions, evidence sub-
mitted in open court.13
In Irwin, the defendant was able to show that eight out of twelve jurors
thought he was guilty before the trial began as a result of stories they read
in the local newspapers. The "facts" recited in the news accounts of the crime
were never repeated at the trial. The Supreme Court reversed defendant's
conviction by this jury, holding the State failed ". to afford a fair
hearing."' 4
Like the proverbial ostrich, the head of the news media is buried though
by its own choice. The press can believe what it chooses to believe, but that
does not make it so. There is not "much ado about nothing." The activities
of the press do obstruct the administration of justice in criminal trials by
interfering with defendant's right to a fair trial. In no instance is this better
illustrated than in Sheppard v. Maxwell.15 The facts should be recited in
some detail.
Dr. Sheppard was accused of the murder of his wife. For weeks before
the trial, the details of the police investigation were reported in the press,
usually on the front pages of the three Cleveland newspapers. The editorials
strongly implied Sheppard was guilty. An inquest was held at the insistence
of the press. A school gymnasium was selected for the occasion. The Court
described the scene vividly:
In front of the room was a long table occupied by reporters, tele-
vision and radio personnel and broadcasting equipment. The hear-
ing was broadcast with live microphones .... A swarm of reporters
and photographers attended. Sheppard was brought into the room
by police who searched him in full view of several hundred spec-
tators. 18
That the newspaper stories were having an effect upon the public was also
evident at the hearing: ".... When Sheppard's counsel attempted to place
some documents in the record, he was forcibly ejected from the room by the
Coroner, who received cheers, hugs and kisses from ladies in the audience."' 7
Sheppard came to trial in an atmosphere of hysteria created by the news
media. The press had even brought the jury to the attention of the public:
12 366 US. 717 (1961). 15 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
13 Id. at 730. 16 Id. at 339.
14 Id. at 728. 17 Id. at 340.
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All three Cleveland papers published the names and addresses of
the veniremen. As a consequence, anonymous letters and telephone
calls, as well as calls from friends, regarding the impending prose-
cution were received by all the prospective jurors.'8
The conduct of the trial was opprobrious. Twenty representatives of
the press were given seats inside the bar, only three feet from the jury. A
radio station broadcast from the courthouse building. All the participants
in the trial were ". . . . photographed and televised whenever they entered
or left the courtroom."' 9
The press showed no respect for the dignity of the court or the rights
of the defendant:
The courtroom remained crowded to capacity with representatives
of the news media. Their movement in and out of the courtroom
often caused so much confusion that, despite the loudspeaker system
installed in the courtroom, it was difficult for the witnesses and
counsel to be heard. Furthermore, the reporters clustered within the
bar of the small courtroom made confidential talk among Sheppard
and his counsel almost impossible during the proceedings. 20
As could be expected, Sheppard was convicted by the trial court. The
Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. The United States Supreme
Court reversed because of the prejudicial publicity. ".... Due process re-
quires that the accused receive a trial by an impartial jury free from outside
influences." 21
The assassination of President John Kennedy provides a final and poig-
nant illustration of the reporters' techniques and their serious interference
with defendants' rights. The Dallas Police Chief warned newsmen they were
not to interrogate Lee Harvey Oswald, but to no avail for ".... when he was
brought into the room they began to shout questions at him ... The noise
and confusion mounted as reporters shouted at each other to get out of the
way and cameramen made frantic efforts to get into position for pictures."22
The Warren Commission doubted the feasibility of obtaining a fair trial
for Oswald in Dallas or anywhere else because of the news coverage the
suspect received. 23
Indeed, it was the spectacle of press conduct in the Kennedy assassina-
tion that led to the establishment by the American Bar Association of a
separate committee to study fair trial and free press.2 4 The Warren Com-
mission had recommended that such a study be made.25
18 Id. at 342.
19 Id. at 344.
20 Ibid.
21 Id. at 362.
22 Report of the Warren Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy at
193-4 (1964).
23 Ibid.
24 Reardon, Standards Relating to Fair Trial and Free Press, A.B.A. Project on
Minimal Standards for Criminal Justice, at vii (1968).
25 Ibid.
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Admittedly, the press does not interfere detrimentally with the judicial
process in all criminal cases. The problem only arises when there is "news,"
i.e., information that will sell newspapers. This occurs, however, in a signifi-
cant number of cases. 26 Then, the desire to peddle papers runs its full course
and the result is compromise of the defendant's right to a fair trial. It is
hardly acceptable to sacrifice the rights of a defendant whom the press finds
newsworthy, while reserving a fair trial for the defendant in whom the press
expresses no interest. So long as the courts, and not the press, administer
criminal law,2 7 each defendant should receive a fair trial. Our system of
justice requires it.
A CONFLICT OF RIGHTS
The juxtaposition of equally forceful guarantees in the United States
Constitution to the press and to criminal defendants has resulted in a major
conflict of rights. The constitutional armor of the press could not be sturdier:
".... Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press." 28 No less resistant to penetration is the iron plate which shields
the defendant in a criminal trial: ".... the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein
the crime shall have been committed." 29
Although the Constitution provides explicitly for the rights of free
press and fair trial, legal history records faithful observance of the privileges
of the press 30 without extending equally sensitive protection to the rights of
the defendant in a criminal trial.3 ' One courageous federal judge has made
note of this fact and cannot understand why the respective guarantees of free
press and fair trial are not on equal footing before the courts:
It is enough to state here that press interference with the proper
administration of criminal justice is no minimum interference with
26 Id. at 22. The number of cases involved is discussed. The Committee concludes the
problem is significant.
27 Those who write about the fair trial-free press problem normally discuss three
rights: (1) fair trial, (2) free press, (3) the government's right to administer justice fairly.
The government's right to administer justice is alluded to in this paragraph in connection
with defendant's right to a fair trial. Generally, I include the right to administer justice
with fair trial and contrast this with free press.
28 U. S. Const. Amend. I. Free speech is protected from encroachment by the States
through the incorporation of the free speech guarantees into the due process restriction of
the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
29 U. S. Const. Amend. VI. The Fifth Amendment contains other important guarantees
for the criminal defendant, including the due process clause as it applies to the federal
government.
30 2 Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, Section 1884 (1956).
"There is a good deal of loose reasoning on the subject of the liberty of the press, as if
its individuality were constitutionally such, that, like the King of England, it could do no
wrong, and was free from every inquiry, and afforded a perfect sanctuary for every abuse;
that, in short, it implied a despotic sovereignty to do every sort of wrong, without the
slightest accountability to private or public justice."
31 State v. Baltimore Radio Show, Inc., 193 Md. 300, 67 A.2d 497 (1949).
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a relatively inconsequential activity in society which must compete
in the marketplace, as it were, for attention, influence and effective-
ness; it is an interference with a constitutionally protected guaran-
tee, one to which the Bill of Rights accords at least as full dignity as
'freedom of the press.' This analysis, it seems to me, properly dis-
lodges the press from this superior footing which it enjoys in consti-
tutionally unprotected areas, and requires that it justify itself in a
no-more-than-equal setting.3 2
Justice Frankfurter concurs in earnest, "The Court has not yet decided that
the fair administration of criminal justice must be subordinated to another
safeguard of our constitutional system-freedom of the press, properly con-
ceived." 33
THE PRESENT LAW
What does the United States Supreme Court require in order to reverse
a federal or state court decision because of prejudicial publicity?
Defendants in state and federal criminal prosecutions possess the right
to a jury trial. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
prevents the abridgment of trial by jury in the federal courts. Although not
obligated by the United States Constitution to use the jury system, every
state has voluntarily chosen to make a jury available to criminal defendants,
and has guaranteed this right in their respective constitutions. 4 Whatever
procedure states use for the disposition of criminal cases must be in accor-
dance with due process of law.35 When the jury system is used, the jurors
must be impartial. In other words, the defendant is guaranteed the right
to a fair trial, by jury or otherwise. It is trial by jury, with its attendant
standard of impartiality, which is the main subject of inquiry. Judges are
considered more immune to the effects of prejudicial publicity than jurors.
If a jury trial requires impartial jurors, what is impartiality? The word
is mentioned in the United States Constitution,36 but it is not defined. The
Supreme Court was keenly aware of this:
Impartiality is not a technical conception. It is a state of mind.
For the ascertainment of this mental attitude of appropriate indif-
ference, the Constitution lays down no particular tests and proce-
dure is not claimed to any ancient and artificial formula.3 7
32 Will, Free Press vs. Fair Trial, 12 DePaul L. Rev. 197, 199 (1963).
33 Irwin v. Dodd, 366 U.S. 717, 730 (1961).
34 Columbia University Legislation Drafting and Research Fund, Index of State
Constitutions, at 578 (1959), cited in Jaffe, Press and the Oppressed: Part 1, 56 J. Crim.
L.C. & P.S. 1, 2 (1965).
35 The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires it.
36 U. S. Const. Amend. VI.
37 United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 145 (1936). Defendant, a civil servant, argued
unsuccessfully that his trial by a jury whose membership consisted of fellow civil servants
was prejudicial because the jurors were bound to hold for the government as a result of
their employment.
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The courts have developed a general test, however, by which to ascertain
the ".... mental attitude of appropriate indifference." A juror is impartial
if he forms his opinion of the defendant's guilt or innocence from informa-
tion he has received in the courtroom: "The theory of our legal system is
that conclusions to be reached in a case will be induced only by evidence
and argument in open court, and not by any outside information, whether
of private talks or public print."38
The history of the application of the test is the history of the law in this
area. Courts have always stressed that the standard is not absolute. A juror
is not expected to be free from all preconceived ideas about the defendant's
guilt or innocence: "To hold the mere existence of any preconceived notions
as to the guilt or innocence of an accused, without more, is sufficient to rebut
the presumption of a prospective juror's impartiality would be to establish
an impossible standard."3 9 Most jurors will have read something about the
case. To this the court replies, "It is sufficient if the juror can lay aside his
impression or opinion and render a verdict based upon the evidence pro-
duced in court."40 This reasoning is acceptable if you can determine the
point at which an opinion is so deep-seated that it cannot be set aside. The
courts have struggled with this issue.
If the juror says he will not be influenced by what he has read or heard
outside the courtroom, is this sufficient? Have you shown actual prejudice
when a juror admits having a preconceived idea or opinion? In some circum-
stances, can the law conclusively presume prejudice? If the community is
saturated with news reports, can the court presume an impartial jury is un-
available? This would be, of course, a subjective test.
In Reynolds v. U.S., 4 1 the United States Supreme Court formulated the
actual prejudice rule:
The theory of the law is that a juror who has formed an opinion
cannot be impartial ... (but) the defendant must show the existence
of a preformed opinion which is of such a nature and such strength
that a presumption of partiality is raised.42
The Court further held, ".... The finding of the trial court upon that issue
ought not to be set aside by the reviewing court unless error is manifest." 43
The defendant had to show the actual prejudice of a juror through an
8 Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907).
89 Irwin v. Dodd, 366 U.S. 717, 723 (1961).
40 Ibid. A different problem exists when the juror has been exposed to prejudicial
publicity but is not consciously aware of its ill effects. He cannot admit to prejudice he
does not know exists. This situation can only be resolved by a subjective rule, i.e., the pre-
sumption of prejudice under certain circumstances.
41 9S U.S. 145 (1878).
42 Id. at 156.
48 .bid.
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admission at voir dire or during the trial. In a doubtful case, the ruling of
the court was subject to review only if error was "manifest." 44
The heavy weight given to the opinion of the trial judge was a burden-
some obstacle to overcome in seeking a reversal on the basis of prejudicial
publicity. Not until Irwin v. Dodd45 was there genuine relief. In Irwin a
showing of actual prejudice was required. Eight of the twelve jurors ad-
mitted they thought the defendant was guilty before the trial began. To this
extent, Reynolds was followed. However, in Irwin, the Court overturned the
trial judge's finding that the jury was impartial. In arriving at its decision,
the Court conducted an independent inspection of the 2783 voir dire record.46
The Court had never before challenged a trial judge's finding of impartial-
ity, but felt compelled to do so in this case: ...... we can only say that in
light of the circumstances here the finding of impartiality does not meet the
constitutional standards.47
The Court promptly demonstrated it was unwilling to extend Irwin
beyond its facts. The occasion was Beck v. Washington.48 The Court distin-
guished the cases on several grounds, all factual: (1) the news stories in Beck
were not as distasteful as in Irwin; (2) 27% of the jurors in Beck admitted
preconception of the defendant's guilt during voir dire; the figure was 90% in
Irwin. The effect of Beck was to announce that a review of the trial judge's
finding of impartiality would only occur when the facts in Irwin were sub-
stantially duplicated.
A new course was charted in 1963. In Rideau v. Louisiana,4 9 the Su-
preme Court accepted a subjective test. Although the objective standard
embodied in the actual prejudice rule was retained, the Court now permitted
a presumption of partiality to be raised when the publicity reached a requi-
site level, whether or not the juror admitted to being influenced by his
exposure to the news.
The defendant in Rideau confessed to murder on television in an inter-
view with the sheriff. Three jurors had seen the television program. When
questioned by the judge, the jurors responded that they could reach a deci-
sion exclusively on the basis of the evidence. 50 The confession was not ad-
mitted as evidence. The defendant was convicted; however, the Supreme
Court reversed:
44 The Supreme Court reaffirmed Reynolds v. United States, supra note 41, in Holt
v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910), Spies v. Illinois, 123 U.S. 131 (1887), and Hopt v. Utah,
120 U.S. 430 (1887).
45 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
46 Id. at 727.
47 Id. at 728.
48 369 U.S. 541 (1962).
49 373 U.S. 723 (1963).
50 Id. at 726-7.
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The record shows that such a thing as this never took place
before in Calcasieu Parish, Louisiana. Whether it has occurred else-
where we do not know. But we do not hesitate to hold without
pausing to examine a particularized transcript of the voir dire ex-
amination of the members of the jury, that due process of the law
in this case required a trial before a jury drawn from a community
of people who had not seen or heard Rideau's televised "inter-
view." 51
In 1965, the Supreme Court reversed a defendant's conviction because
his trial was ".... televised and broadcast." 52 There was no requirement
that actual prejudice be shown through an examination of the voir dire
records or in any other manner. The prosecution insisted actual prejudice
must be demonstrated, but the Court replied:
The state points too broadly in this contention, for the Court
itself has found instances in which a showing of actual prejudice is
not a prerequisite to reversal. This is such a case. It is true that in
most cases involving claims of due process deprivation we require a
showing of identifiable prejudice to the accused. Nevertheless, at
times a procedure employed by the state involves such a probability
that prejudice will result that it is deemed inherently lacking in due
process. 53
How much publicity is required to invoke the presumption of partiality?
There is no adequate test to determine this. Sheppard v. Maxwell5 4 applied
the subjective rule. The defense was unable to demonstrate actual prejudice
from voir dire or from the single query of the jury during the trial.55 The
Supreme Court reversed, however, because of the insidious nature and over-
whelming volume of news reporting. The Court was convinced some preju-
dicial material reached the jury: ".... Nor is there any doubt that this
deluge of publicity reached at least some of the jury."56 Partiality was pre-
sumed, but under such dramatic conditions. It is clear if prejudicial publicity
reaches the proportions of the Sheppard case, the Supreme Court will reverse.
What Sheppard leaves unresolved is the issue of how much less the Court is
willing to accept before it will presume prejudice.
What can be deduced from these cases is that the Supreme Court will
reverse federal and state court convictions because of prejudicial publicity if:
(I) there is a showing of actual prejudice among the jurors which will influ-
ence their verdict; (2) there is sufficient evidence that a finding of impartiality
by the trial judge is unreliable because the publicity is of such a nature to
rebut even statements of impartiality by the jurors themselves; (3) publicity
has reached such proportions that a conclusion of unfairness is mandatory.
51 Ibid.
52 Estes v. Texas, 381 US. 352 (1965).
53 Ibid.
54 384 U.S. 333 (1966).




What means are available to protect the accused criminal from the
effects of inflammatory publicity? Certain procedural safeguards are avail-
able. The most frequently utilized are: (1) change of venue, (2) continuance,
(3) voir dire, (4) appellate process.
Unfortunately, the use of these procedures rarely solves the problem,
and sometimes adds to the injury. Change of venue involves delay, which
conflicts with the defendant's right to a speedy trial, not to mention the
inconvenience and expense of such a move. Whenever a change of venue is
sought, defendant is giving up his right to be tried ".... by an impartial
jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed
...."5T Furthermore, the practical benefits of a change of venue are dubious
where there has been intensive state-wide or national news coverage.
The continuance is granted to provide a "cooling-off" period. The right
of the defendant to a speedy trial is again in conflict. The difficulties of pre-
serving evidence are manifold. When the trial is begun, there is no way to
prevent the press from "making an issue" out of the defendant once again.
Voir dire is perhaps the most helpful of the procedural safeguards. De-
fense attorneys can dismiss jurors for cause if they can demonstrate actual
prejudice. The difficulty is that the judge determines the basis for the
challenge and standards vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. The real
Achilles heel in the remedy is subconscious prejudice. How do you demon-
strate a juror has been prejudiced by newspaper accounts of the trial if he
is unaware of it himself?58
Seeking reversal in the appellate court is expensive, time-consuming,
and uncertain. As discussed in the last section, the volume and nature of
the publicity must be overwhelming and highly detrimental for the presump-
tion of prejudice; or there must be proof of its effect upon the jury. A
reversal will not prevent the press from "taking up the cross" anew at the
second trial, any more than a continuance will necessarily dampen their
enthusiasm.
The most effective remedy in the hands of the courts for the prevention
and cure of prejudicial publicity is the contempt power. The federal courts
had a good start toward a solution of the problem in Toledo Newspaper
Company v. United States.59 The Newspaper had been held in contempt of
court pursuant to a contempt provision of the Judicial Code.60 The paper
57 U. S. Const. Amend. VI.
58 Wild and Danzig, A Study of the Way in Which a Jury Verdict is Reached, 53
Am. J. Psychology 518 (1940). Contrary to assertions of the press, there are studies which
reveal the effects of prejudicial publicity upon jurors.
59 247 U.S. 402 (1918).
60 Judicial Code, Section 268, 36 Stat. 1163 (1911).
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
appealed. It argued that the trial court lacked the power to punish for
contempt under the Judicial Code; and in the alternative, that, if the court
had the power, the Judicial statute was unconstitutional because it violated
the First Amendment guarantee of free press. The Supreme Court affirmed
the contempt conviction. The Court construed the Code as giving the
judiciary power to punish for contempt any act which obstructs the admin-
istration of justice.6 ' The Court saw no conflict with freedom of the press
which like ".... every other right enjoyed in human society is subject to
the restraints which separate right from wrong-doing." 62 The Court even
formulated a test to determine if acts were contemptuous and stated it is
".... not the influence upon the mind of the particular judge that is the
criterion but the reasonable tendency of the acts done to influence or bring
about the baleful result .... ,,63
This trend toward liberalization of the techniques available to deal with
a predatory press was unceremoniously halted when the Supreme Court
overruled Toledo in Nye v. United States.64 Under Nye the federal courts
could only punish acts for contempt if they were committed in the courtroom
or in the immediate vicinity of the court. This placed out-of-court publica-
tions completely beyond the reach of the court's discipline.
State courts can only punish out-of-court publications if the publication
constitutes a ".... clear and present danger to the administration of jus-
tice." 65 By so holding in Bridges v. California,6 6 said a dissenting justice, the
majority permitted First Amendment guarantees to annihilate the right to
an impartial trial.67 The Bridges decision has been expressly affirmed in a
trilogy of cases,68 the most recent in 1962. The only ray of hope is that the
affirming decisions were all bench trials. The door remains open if the Court
chooses to make the contempt remedy available in jury trials. In view of
the Court's idolatry of First Amendment freedoms, the author is not
optimistic.
Procedural remedies are available, but generally ineffective. The power-
ful weapon of contempt citation has been voluntarily dismantled despite its
being the only current remedy that could prevent an undisciplined press
from ravaging the halls of justice.
RECOMMENDATIONS
If the courts have imprisoned themselves within a dilemma, they have
the key. Nye should be overruled and Toledo reinstated. The courts should
61 Supra note 59, at 419.
62 Id. at 420.
63 Id. at 421.
64 313 U.S. 33 (1941).
65 Bridges v. California, 341 U.S. 252 (1941).
66 Ibid.
07 Id. at 284.
68 Pennelsamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946); Craig v. Harvey, 331 U.S. $67 (1947);
Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962).
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be permitted to hold the news media in contempt if a publication has a
reasonably certain tendency to interfere with the administration of justice.
The Fair Trial and Free Press Committee of the American Bar Asso-
ciation has recommended limited use of the contempt power after its ex-
haustive study of the issue. The Committee was aware that usage of the
power can raise ".... grave constitutional questions . ..,"69 but it warned
that "..... deliberate action constituting a serious threat to a fair trial not go
unpunished .... ,"7o The Committee outlines a test which, in summary,
punishes only those who knowingly disobey judicial orders not to dissemi-
nate information or wittingly distribute news that is calculated to affect the
outcome of a trial in the absence of a judicial order.7 1
Other measures are needed in addition to the revitalization of the con-
tempt power. Information must be possessed by the news media if the media
is to disseminate it. That is axiomatic. What is not commonly understood,
however, is that the press does not get most of the information it prints from
the detective-like probing of conscientious reporters. Information is given to
the press, largely, by police officers and judicial personnel, including prose-
cution and defense attorneys. Equally important to realize is that informa-
tion breaks down into certain categories which are highly prejudicial, and
into others which are not as harmful to criminal defendants, if the informa-
tion in the latter is harmful at all. The rules of evidence supply the guide-
lines for the classification of information into prejudicial or non-prejudicial
material. The final point worth noting is the factor of timing-information
released before the trial may be inflammatory, but that same information
released after the trial will have no detrimental effects upon the rights of
the criminal defendant.
With these principles in mind, policies can be formed which are most
effective in protecting the accused's right to a fair trial. This is precisely what
has occurred in the Reardon Report on Standards Relating to Fair Trial and
Free Press.
The Reardon Report would regulate the flow of information to the
press and control the utilization of any information which the press happens
to possess in accordance with the usage of the criminal proceedings and
during a period of time beforehand. Four time periods are outlined as
potentially dangerous to the rights of the accused: (1) Before arrest or formal
charge; (2) From arrest or formal charge to the beginning of trial; (3) From
commencement of trial to the rendering of the verdict; and, (4) After verdict.
The restrictions upon news vary with each period depending upon the
69 Reardon, Standards Relating to Fair Trial and Free Press, A.B.A. Project on
Minimal Standards for Criminal Justice, at 14 (1968).
70 Ibid.
71 Id. at 14-15.
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degree of damage to the rights of the accused. 72 For example, the source of
concern in number one, before arrest or formal charge, is statements by
public officials ".... whose words have the ring of authority and authen-
ticity. '73 The report notes:
In another case police announcements prior to arrest, assuring
the public the identity of the murderer was known, may well have
contributed to a climate in which a man was convicted who was
ultimately pardoned after another man confessed. 74
From the standpoint of classifying types of information which are par-
ticularly prejudicial, the Reardon Report renders a great service. Only if
you know what information to restrict can you establish meaningful guide-
lines for the conduct of police and judicial personnel. The Report discusses
nine categories of news which, if not admitted at the trial, will be prejudicial
to the defendant in the possession of the jury: (1) Confessions; (2) Prior
criminal records; (3) Defendant's refusal to submit to tests, such as a poly-
graph; (4) Characterizations of the defendant, for example, as a "mad killer";
(5) Description of evidence seized, but not admissible; (6) Hearsay statements;
(7) Plea negotiations; (8) Statements by defense counsel to put his case in a
favorable light; (9) Reports of occurrences in preliminary hearings. If the
jury is to receive information in these nine categories it will be at the trial
subject to the rules of evidence, not from the press.
Sequestration of the jury should be used, but only if necessary. It must
be handled carefully in order not to arouse the jury's anger and focus it upon
the party who requested the sequestration. As a general policy it is inad-
visable. The State bears heavy expense; the defense always risks incurring
the jury's wrath whether or not it has requested the sequestration. The
Reardon Report is consistent with this position.7 5
A final comment is cautionary. Whatever remedy is adopted to achieve
a more realistic balance between the rights of free speech and fair trial, it
must have teeth. Indeed, the real significance of Sheppard v. Maxwell 76 is
the Court's call for action.
Authors often speak of voluntary restraint by the bar and the press as a
desirable means of achieving something. What? This article has devoted
considerable space to demonstrate that the press is unwilling to curb its
appetite for news in the interests of criminal defendants. The bar's record
of self-imposed standards for the protection of an accused criminal is as
ignoble as that of the press. There will be no remedy without penalties
for misconduct.
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